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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
OUTSOURCING CONFIGURATIONS
AND ORGANIZATIONAL OUTCOMES
Abstract
Research has reported mixed relationships between different Information Technology Outsourcing
(ITO) (e.g. ‘total’ and ‘selective’) approaches and organizational performance. Most ITO research
takes a reductionist approach, which only examines unidirectional linear relationships between
specific ITO attributes and organizational performance. Configurational theory as an alternative
approach has been suggested.
This study employs a theory-driven and empirically-grounded list of attributes to construct ITO
configurations. Then it uses a set-theoretic method to empirically examine the ITO configurationorganizational outcome relationship. Data were collected through a survey administered to the
members of the International Association of Outsourcing Professionals (IAOP). Our findings suggest
five different ITO configurations that lead to cost reduction, capability enhancement, and innovation.
The theoretical foundation for ITO research and configurational approach is reviewed next. We then
suggest five key attributes of ITO configurations and three common organizational outcomes.
Thereafter, we present our findings and put forth several implications for ITO studies.

Keywords: Outsourcing, Configuration, Organizational, Outcomes

1.0

Theory

Configurational theory is concerned with the constellations of strategic, structural, and
environmental attributes that can describe a large proportion of high-performing
organizations (Miller 1981; Miller 1986; Mintzberg and Lampel 1999). The basis of
configuration is the notion that the whole is best understood from a systemic
perspective and should be viewed as a constellation of interconnected elements (Ragin
2008). Configuration thus recognizes multiple conjunctural causality, which is
proposed as an alternative perspective to the reductionist perspective of unidirectional
and linear relationships between external contingencies and organizational attributes
(Meyer et al. 1993). In other words, configurational theory takes a holistic synthesis
of reciprocal and nonlinear relationships among organizational attributes. It
recognizes equifinality, which is the idea of multiple possible paths or configurations
toward the same organizational outcomes. Thus, it is a useful lens to study complex
phenomena, which often involve interactions of highly-related attributes (Fink 2010;
Miller 1986; Mintzberg and Lampel 1999).
Configurational theory has been proposed to address some nagging issues in ITO
research (Cullen et al. 2005; Fink 2010; Lacity et al. 2010). It can potentially expose

the complex dynamics of organizational attributes that sometimes lead to
contradicting results in ITO studies (Cullen et al. 2005; Fink 2010). It also allows
researchers to combine attributes from multiple theoretical perspectives in a more
holistic investigation (Lee et al. 2004). Recent ITO review has called for more studies
on ITO configurations to reveal the complexity in crafting and carrying out ITO
contracts (Lacity et al. 2010).
Following Lee et al. (2004) and Cullen et al. (2005), we focus on ITO strategies and
define an ITO configuration as a high-level description of strategic choices that
underlie the making of ITO arrangements. Next, we review the extant ITO
configuration literature.

1.1 Prior Studies on ITO Configurations and Our Approach
Although configurational theory has been applied in various studies (Ketchen et al.
1997), there is only a handful of ITO studies using configurational theory. Table 1
provides an overview of the three key studies. While these studies are helpful in
understanding the complexity of ITO configurations and subsequent outcomes,
several limitations remain. First, they are inconsistent in examining empirically the
causal relationship between ITO configurations and organizational outcomes. Of the
three exemplary studies, one uses regression analysis, one uses case comparison, and
the other study suggests set-theoretic approach without empirical analysis. Second,
they are inconsistent in constructing the list of attributes for ITO configurations. Two
studies rely on a deductive approach to synthesize attributes from theories while one
study use an inductive approach to generate attributes from qualitative observations.
To address these limitations, we utilize a theory-driven and empirical-grounded list of
attributes to study ITO configurations, and employ a set-theoretic approach to
examine the ITO configuration-organizational outcomes relationship (Fink 2010). Our
configurational approach allows us to integrate multiple outsourcing theories and
reconcile empirical contradictions while addressing issues from a reductionist
approach. Prior IT configuration studies have simplified the causal link between IT
configurations and organizational outcomes, which abstract away the interdependence
of attributes (Lee et al. 2004).
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Empirical Studies on ITO Configurations.

1.2 Attributes of ITO Configurations
One of the challenges in conducting configurational studies is the difficulty in
determining key attributes in configurations (Ketchen et al. 1997; Miller 1996).
Employing a narrow scope with an exclusive list of attributes leads to abstract
configurations, but employing a broader scope with an inclusive list of attributes can
lead to too many configurations that is difficult to interpret. The struggle of finding
the right balance between “zooming out” and “zooming in” is prevalent in

configurational studies and require careful considerations in research design.
Following prior studies, we review ITO literature to construct a list of core attributes
for ITO configurations that satisfy two criteria: 1) they need to be grounded in
theories, and 2) they are supported by empirical evidence to have strong causal
relationships with ITO outcomes (Cullen et al. 2005; Fink 2010; Miller 1996).
There are various theories used to explain how ITO delivers certain organizational
outcomes: resource-based theory, resource-dependence theory, transaction cost
theory, agency cost theory, among others (Cheon et al. 1995). In general, two major
theoretical camps stand out: the first one includes governance-based theories (e.g.,
transaction cost theory, coordination theory, contract theory) and the second one
includes capability-based theories (e.g., competencies theory, resource-based theory)
(Fink 2010). We review the literature of these two major research camps and identify
major attributes that have strong empirical evidence to support how such attribute
contributes to ITO success. This approach allows us to later construct an inclusive
survey instrument while maintaining a coherent structure for the respondents to
follow. The details of these attributes are presented next.

1.2.1 Service Level Strategy
Service level strategy describes the degree of outsourcing for various IT functions,
including application developments, operations activities, or management and support
functions (Cullen et al. 2005). An organization can outsource different IT functions at
various degrees. For example, outsourcing only technology supporting help desk or
completely the whole help desk service. The degree of outsourced IT functions
determines the level of IT capabilities an organization gains through outsourcing. The
combination of all IT functions being outsourced and their degree of outsourcing
constitutes an outsourcing portfolio, and the nature of this portfolio will have different
implications on performance. For instance, organizations with a mostly outsourcing
model are often outperformed by organizations with a partial outsourcing or
insourcing model (Lacity and Willcocks 1998; Lacity and Willcocks 2001). An
organization can be classified as using a mostly outsourcing model if 80% or more of
IT services are outsourced; using a partially outsourcing model if between 20% to
80% of IT services are outsourced; and using an insourcing model if less than 20% of
IT services are outsourced (Lacity and Willcocks 1998).

1.2.2 Supplier Strategy
Supplier strategy specifies the number of suppliers that provide ITO services. The
supplier strategy determines how an ITO contract is carried out, and how IT
capabilities are provided. Prior studies have suggested that supplier strategy can
mitigate ITO risks (Currie 1998), provide capabilities for specific needs (Cullen et al.
2005), or increase the probability to find the best supplier fit (Levina and Su 2008).
Following Cullen et al. (2005), we identify four different supplier strategies. Sole
supplier refers to a situation in which one supplier provides all ITO services without
any subcontracting. On the other hand, a prime supplier acts as a single point of
accountability for the ITO contracts, but has multiple subcontracts with other
suppliers to provide ITO services. An organization may also take a best-of-breed
model in which it uses multiple suppliers for ITO services. Finally, a panel is where
an organization chooses from a list of preferred suppliers for their ITO services. These
suppliers compete with each other, and work is not guaranteed.

1.2.3 Commercial Relationship
Commercial relationship describes the high level relationship structure between an
organization and its ITO suppliers. Such relationship can be captured in the
contractual arrangements of an ITO relationship, that is, ITO contracts. Different ITO
contract types have been found to significantly impact ITO performance (Fitoussi and
Gurbaxani 2012; Oshri et al. 2015; Qi and Chau 2012). Lacity and Willcocks (1998)
identified three types of ITO contracts: fee-for-service, strategic alliance/partnership,
and buy-in contract. In fee-for-service contract, an organization pays a fee to a
supplier in exchange for the ITO services. There are four major fee-for-service
contracts. Generic contracts are off-the-self contract, provided by either the suppliers
or the outsourcing organization without much customization. A detailed contract
includes specific and detailed clauses for ITO services such as service scope, service
levels, performance measures, and penalties. In contrast, a loose contract does not
contain detailed clauses, but it does allow some customization as compared to a
generic contract. Lastly, a mixed contract is a combination of detailed and loose
contracts in which some detailed clauses are provided for service scope, service
levels, performance measurement, and penalties.
The second type of contract is strategic partnership in which both the organization and
its ITO suppliers pool resources together to create, add to, or maximize joint value.

They share benefits and risks in this collaborative inter-organizational relationship.
The last type of contract, buy-in, refers to situations in which an organization buys in
vendor resources to supplement in-house capabilities, and the vendor resources are
managed by in-house management. This situation is similar to insourcing and
therefore is excluded in our study.

1.2.4 Pricing Strategy
Pricing strategy describes the method by which the payment to the ITO suppliers is
calculated. It is often considered a legal arrangement in ITO contracts and therefore
significantly characterize the client-supplier relationship. Following Cullen et al.
(2005), we define three main categories for ITO pricing framework. First, an
organization can use a fixed price model in which the organization specifies a fixed
amount for an ITO contract (e.g., $1 million per year for data center operations). In
reality, this quoted price is rarely fixed but is often adjusted for fluctuated services or
additional fees. The second option is to use unit price model in which outsourcing
suppliers charge a price per a specific transaction unit (e.g., $100 per software
update). The last option is to use a cost plus model in which suppliers charge the cost
of ITO services plus additional markup (e.g., cost plus 5% markup) or management
fee (e.g., cost plus $1 million fee). This approach is useful when uncertainty is high
and the ITO contract needs some flexibility

1.2.5 Contract Commitment
The last governance-based attribute is contract commitment, defined as the frequency
with which an organization renews its ITO contracts (Cullen et al. 2005). A frequently
renewable contract can provide outsourcing flexibility, mitigate risks from incomplete
contracts, and allow reactive adaptation to changing environment (Harris et al. 1998;
Tan and Sia 2006). An organization can choose to use a single term contracts with no
renewable option; an evergreen contract with no expiry and is only terminated when
one party invokes its termination rights; and a rollover contract is one in which it has
a fixed initial term but also has options to extend depending on latter assessments
(e.g., supplier performance).
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1.3 Organizational Outcomes of ITO
Most ITO studies identify two direct organizational outcomes of ITO: cost reduction
and capability enhancement (Gwebu et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2011;
Levina and Ross 2003). By outsourcing IT functionalities to third-party, organizations
can take advantage of economies-of-scale offered by these suppliers, utilize extra
capabilities available in their services, and gain resources to focus on their core
business activities (Gwebu et al. 2010; Lacity et al. 2010; Levina and Ross 2003;
Levina and Su 2008). Recent studies also point out the possibility of using ITO
services to create strategic innovation (Oshri et al. 2015). Strategic innovation is
defined as ways that significantly enhance a firm’s existing product or service or
enable the firm to enter new markets (Oshri et al. 2015). A strong outsourcing

relationship can enhance existing relational and contractual governance and allow
firms to exploit new and innovative products, services, and markets. In sum, our study
examines three organizational outcomes of ITO: cost reduction, capability
enhancement, and strategic innovation (through outsourcing).

2.0

Method

To identify ITO configurations, we develop a cross-sectional survey, which is the
recommended approach to study existing ITO arrangements across a large sample size
(Fink 2010). It is important to note that given our purpose to study ITO
configurations, our survey does not use variance-based questions that aim to identify
latent variables but rather use questions to identify attributes of ITO configurations.
Nevertheless, we follow survey development principles to establish credibility and
reliability for our survey instrument (Czaja and Blair 2005; DeVellis 2003). Our
survey was developed in two stages (Czaja and Blair 2005). In the first stage, survey
design, we develop survey questions for ITO attributes using prior studies (Cullen et
al. 2005; Grover et al. 1996; Oshri et al. 2015). All questions for independent
variables were developed to capture ITO attributes on various degrees instead of
identifying latent variables. For example, to capture the ITO service level strategy, the
survey question asks respondents to rank their outsourcing level for different
categories such as IT application, operations, management, and support. On the other
hands, questions for dependent variables use instruments for latent variables based on
prior studies. This approach has been used by prior studies on ITO configurations
(Lee et al. 2004). All questions were adjusted to better fit our purposes as well as new
ITO advancements, such as cloud sourcing. In the second stage, pretest, we discussed
the survey instrument with seven academics with expertise in outsourcing research.
We used the feedback to revise the questions. We then conducted a pilot study with
four ITO professionals. The results were used to fine-tune the survey instrument.
These steps helped validate the instrument and establish its reliability (Czaja and Blair
2005). Table 3 shows a summary of our concepts.
Measurement description

Reference

ITO Attributes (Independent Variables)
Service Level

Degree of outsourcing from “mostly outsourcing”

(Cullen et

Strategy

to “never consider” on four categories:

al. 2005)

Application, Operations, Management, and
Support
Supplier

Percentage of outsourcing contracts using different (Cullen et

Strategy

types of supplier strategies: One supplier without

al. 2005)

any subcontracting, One supplier that
subcontracts, Multiple suppliers, Pool of suppliers
“on call”, and Others
Pricing

A 5-point Likert scale on how frequency a

(Cullen et

Strategy

company uses the following payment method: A

al. 2005)

fixed amount for a project, Charge a price per a
specific transaction unit, Actual cost plus markup
or management fee, and Other
Contract

A 5-point Likert scale on how frequency a

(Cullen et

Commitment

company uses the following type of contract:

al. 2005)

Single term contracts-fixed one-term contracts,
Rollover-extendable contracts, Evergreen-in
perpetuity, and Other
Commercial

A 5-point Likert scale on how frequency a

(Cullen et

Relationship

company uses the following type of contract:

al. 2005)

Loose contracts, Mixed contracts, Detailed
contracts, Strategic partnership, Generic contracts,
and Other
Organizational Outcomes (Dependent Variables)
Cost

A 7-point Likert scale on the degree of cost

(Grover et

Reduction

reduction a company receives from ITO services

al. 1996)

Capability

A 7-point Likert scale on the degree of capability

(Grover et

Enhancement

enhancement a company receives from ITO

al. 1996)

services
Strategic

A 7-point Likert scale on the degree of

(Oshri et

Innovation

innovativeness a company achieves from using

al. 2015)

ITO services
Table 3.
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The survey was then distributed to the member of the International Association of
Outsourcing Professional (IAOP)—a large organization with more than 20,000
members worldwide. We also solicited the survey in two chapter IAOP meetings in
order to increase response rate. We received 31 responses from companies that have
outsourced their IT activities. The reason for the low response rate is that the majority
of IAOP members are companies that provide outsourcing services. After reviewing
the responses and filtering out unusable or incomplete data, we retained 20 responses
for further analysis. Because we do not know the exact number of outsourcing client
among IAOP members, we cannot report an exact response rate. However, 20
responses is deemed sufficient for a conference report, and we plan to continue data
collection to increase the response number. Table 4 reports the correlation for
dependent variables which were developed using survey instruments that aim to
capture latent variables.
Mean SD

1

1. Cost Reduction 1

5.05 1.19

1

2. Cost Reduction 2

5.10 0.91 .383

3. Cost Reduction 3

4.80 1.36

.461*

4. Capability
Enhancement 1
5. Capability
Enhancement 2
6. Capability
Enhancement 3
7. Strategic Innovation 1

5.30 1.08 .478*

8. Strategic Innovation 2

.589**

9. Strategic Innovation 3
10. Strategic Innovation 4

2

3

4

5

1

.342

.508*

1

4.65 1.18 .723** .278

.314

.457*

5.00 1.03 .517*

.302

.380 .564**

.225

4.25 1.37 .572** .273

4.25 1.21 .320
4.60 1.57 .265

Table 4.

7

8

9

10

1
.738**

4.55 1.23

6

.416
.024
.213

1
1

.366 .657** .706** .374
.320

.540*

.160

.463*

.108

.230

1

.680**

.499*

.847**

1

.359

.509*

.564**

.397

.346

.654**

.342

.527*

1
.610** 1

Correlation for Dependent Variables.

2.1 Data Analysis
The analyses for this study were performed using fsQCA 3.0 (Ragin and Davey 2014)
and followed the steps specified by Liu et al. (2015). In the first step, we transformed
the collected data into Boolean sets (Liu et al. 2015). For each of ITO attributes, we
use cluster analysis to 1) descriptively make sense of the data and 2) transform
multiple-scale questions into a single dimension that is suitable for fuzzy-set analysis.
For example, the survey questions for supplier strategy ask for the percentage of ITO
contracts that utilize different types of supplier strategy such as one supplier with
subcontracts or pool of “on call” suppliers. A cluster analysis allowed us to identify

clusters of ITO practices regarding supplier strategy and transform the data into a
binary classification. Particularly, the value of 1 represented one cluster while the
value of 0 represented another cluster.
In the second step, we used the five transformed variables (or sets) to conduct a crisp
set QCA analysis. The ITO outcomes were cost reduction, capability enhancement,
and strategic innovation. Our analysis steps were described below:
Step 1: Data calibration. All ITO attributes were transformed into a crisp measure
with two types of membership while ITO outcomes were transformed into fuzzy
measures.
a.

Service level strategy: membership of 1 equals to majority outsourcing

strategy while membership of 0 equals to conservative outsourcing strategy.
Organizations with majority outsourcing strategy will outsource IT functions in all
four categories such as IT application, operations, management, and support while
organizations with a conservative outsourcing mostly outsource their IT functions in
IT application and operations.
b.

Supplier strategy: membership of 1 equals to diversified supplier strategy

while membership of 0 equals to flexible supplier strategy. Organizations with a
diversified supplier strategy will mostly use multiple suppliers for their ITO services
while organizations with a flexible supplier strategy will have a wide range of
suppliers from one supplier to pool of on-call suppliers.
c.

Pricing strategy: membership of 1 equals to fixed pricing strategy while

membership of 0 equals to flexible pricing strategy. The former will set a fixed
amount for their ITO contracts while the latter use various pricing strategy including
fixed amount, per transaction, or mark-up on actual costs.
d.

Contract commitment: membership of 1 equals to extendable contracts while

membership of 0 equals to fixed-terms contracts. Organizations with extendable
contracts allow their suppliers to extend ITO contracts while organization with fixedterm contracts set time limit to their ITO contracts, or no time at all.
e.

Commercial relationship: membership of 1 equals to detailed contracts while

membership of 0 equal to mixed-type contracts. The former will mostly use detailed
clauses in their ITO contracts while the latter use various contract types with various
degrees of details.
f.

ITO outcome—cost reduction: a fuzzy measure with 1-4-7 thresholds. In other

words, firms with Likert-scale value of 7 (Strongly agree) will have the full

membership of the cost-reduction set while firms with Likert-scale value of 1
(Strongly disagree) will have the full non-membership of the set
g.

ITO outcome—capability enhancement: a fuzzy measure with 1-4-7

thresholds
h.

ITO outcome—strategic innovation: a fuzzy measure with 1-4-7 thresholds

Step 2: Truth table construction. We constructed a truth table for each of the three
organizational outcomes. To identify the most important and possible configurations,
we use the suggested frequency of 1 and consistency of 0.7 as the cut off points (Liu
et al. 2015; Ragin 2008).

Step 3: Obtain the solution sets. In fs/QCA analysis, three solution sets are possible:
complex, parsimonious, and intermediate (Ragin 2008). They are different based on
how strict the simplifying assumption is. Typically, the intermediate solution is
preferred as it offers interpretable combinations.

Step 4. Interpret and evaluate the solutions. Using solution sets, we identified core and
peripheral conditions for further interpretations of the solutions (Fiss 2011; Ragin
2008). Specifically, core conditions are those that appear in both parsimonious and
intermediate solutions while the peripheral conditions only appear in the intermediate
solutions. The coverage and consistency measures of the final solution were also
reported. Our final interpretation is presented in the findings section.

3.0

Findings

In this section, we report the results of fsQCA analyses to identify ITO configurations
that lead to three different ITO outcomes: cost reduction, capability enhancement, and
strategic innovation.

3.1 ITO Outcome—Cost Reduction
Table 5 shows the result of the fuzzy set analysis of cost reduction outcome for ITO
services. Following the notation in previous QCA-based studies (Fiss 2011; Liu et al.
2015; Ragin 2008), we use black circles (“ ”) to indicate the presence of a condition,
open circles (“ ”) to indicate the absence of a condition, and blank spaces to indicate

“don’t care” or irrelevant conditions. The large size circles represent core conditions
while small size circles represent peripheral conditions. Core conditions have a strong
causal relationship with the outcome while peripheral conditions have a weaker causal
relationship (Fiss 2011). In addition, we use the core conditions to further classify
solutions into first-order and second-order solutions (Fiss 2011; Liu et al. 2015).
Second-order solutions share similar sets of core conditions while first-order solutions
have different sets of core conditions.
The results in Table 5 show that there are two major configurations associated with
cost reduction in ITO services. All together, they have a consistency value of 0.77,
above the threshold of 0.75 suggested by Ragin (2008). The configurations suggest
that firms can have diversified suppliers and specified contracts or use majority
outsourcing model to reduce cost. In the first configuration (solution 1a and 1b), firms
that use diversified suppliers and detailed contracts need to control pricing through a
fixed pricing strategy or continuously engage in extendable contracts. These patterns
allow firms to engage with many outsourcing suppliers and minimize agency risk. In
contrast, in the second configuration (solution 2), firms can use a mostly outsourcing
model to focus on a wider range of outsourced IT services. These firms have a
flexible strategy for suppliers but they emphasize fixed term contracts to reduce costs.
This configuration seems counter-intuitive and we posit that due to the large number
of firms involved with mostly outsourcing strategy, these firms use fixed term
contracts as a way to standardize ITO management and minimize potential complexity
from constant negotiation of new contracts.
Causal conditions
Solution
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Diversified

Fixed

Extendable

Detailed

Raw

Unique

Consistenc

Solution
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0.127

0.786

0.723

0.77

1b

0.379

0.221

0.749

2

0.218

0.218

0.755

ng

Table 5.

ITO Configurations that Lead to Cost Reduction.

3.2 ITO Outcome—Capability Enhancement
Table 6 below shows the result of the fuzzy set analysis of cost reduction outcome for
ITO services. There are three sets of first-order configurations. Out of the three,
configuration 3 has the lowest coverage and has no particular case with exact fit of

conditions. Thus, it can be an artifact of analysis. We dropped it from interpretation.
The remaining two configurations are: 1) firms with diversified suppliers (solution 1a,
1b, and 1c), and 2) firms with majority outsourcing model, flexible suppliers, and
fixed term contracts (solution 2). Together, the configurations have a consistency of
0.78, an acceptable value. In the first configuration, firms can use several conditions
to complement a strategy of diversified suppliers: fixed pricing strategy, fixed term
contracts, or specified contracts. We posit that this configuration uses a supplier
diversity strategy to achieve extra capabilities, and other conditions help firms to
minimize risk. On the other hand, in the second configuration, firms use an ITO
service diversity strategy to outsource a wide range of IT services and therefore gain
extra capabilities
Solutio

Majority

Diversifi

Fixed

n

outsourci

ed

pricin

ng

suppliers

g

Extendab

Detaile

Raw

Unique

Consistenc

le

d

covera

covera

y

contracts

contrac

ge

ge

ts

Solution

n

Consistenc

covera

y

ge

1a

0.285

0.117

0.796

1b

0.172

0.057

0.800

1c

0.172

0.120

0.803

2

0.212

0.212

0.740

3

0.052

0.052

0.730

Table 6.

Solutio

0.725

0.780

ITO Configurations that Lead to Capacity Enhancement.

3.3 ITO Outcome—Strategic Innovation
Table 7 shows the result of the fuzzy set analysis of strategic innovation outcome for
ITO services. Only one configuration is identified (solution 1a and 1b). Although it
has lower coverage than the other configurations, it has the highest consistency,
indicating that the configuration is not common in practice but has a distinctive
pattern. Specifically, the configuration suggests that there is a necessary condition for
firms to gain strategic innovation outcome from ITO services: they need to have a
majority outsourcing model with diversified suppliers and detailed contracts. This
configuration makes sense because by using a wide range of outsourced IT services

using a wide range of suppliers, these firms are able to take advantage of the
capabilities offered by numerous suppliers to be innovative with their products and
services. The finding is consistent with previous studies which suggest that
partnership contracts—using very detailed contracts—accommodate high-quality
relationships between clients-suppliers to help achieve strategic innovation (Oshri et
al. 2015). In our case, the detailed contracts augment the mostly outsourcing models
and diversified supplier strategy to allow firms to achieve strategic innovation.
Soluti
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Fixed

Extendabl
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Consi

Solution
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on
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1a
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0.820

1b
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0.143

0.840

Table 7.

4.0

0.213

0.833

ITO Configurations that Lead to Innovative Achievement.

Discussions

Our five configurations are summarized in Table 8. Our findings contribute directly to
empirical studies on ITO outcomes and configuration studies on ITO management.
First, our findings help us understand multiple and conjunctural causalities that can
contribute to ITO outcomes. While prior ITO research have identified numerous
factors that contribute to ITO success in isolation (Lacity et al. 2010; Lacity et al.
2009), it is not clear how these different factors interact and contribute to ITO success
together. The ITO configuration approach aims to address this limitation by
identifying different configurations or constellations of attributes instead of examining
them in isolation. Second, we integrate across multiple theoretical perspectives and
potentially reconcile any empirical contradictions. Prior ITO studies have called for
integrated theoretical perspectives to have a more complete view of ITO outcomes
(Cheon et al. 1995; Lacity et al. 2011). Our study builds on multiple theories, such as
transaction cost theory, resource-based theory, or agency theory. The study offers a
more complete view than studies that rely on specific theories.
Our five configurations can be described as follow. In the first configuration, reducing
contractual hazards, organizations rely on a diversified number of suppliers to select
the best contracts that allow them to save money. To reduce contractual hazards, these
organizations use detailed contracts to minimize risks. Prior studies confirm this
observation as organizations with detailed contracts often have higher ITO success

rates than other types of contracts (Lacity and Willcocks 1998). In the second
configuration, matured outsourcing clients, organizations that have been doing ITO
will have a larger number of ITO services to offer various IT services. Due to their
experience, they do not rely much on detailed contracts but rather use fixed term
contracts as a way to safeguard against agency risks. Fixed term contracts encourage
ITO suppliers to perform well in order to warrant future ITO contracts (Cullen et al.
2005; Lacity and Willcocks 2001). As a result, these organizations will likely reduce
ITO costs due to the high performance of ITO suppliers.
The third configuration includes organizations that follow a best-of-breed outsourcing
strategy. These organizations use a large number of diversified suppliers for their IT
functions, and often identify and choose suppliers that seem most appropriate for
certain IT functions. As a result, they are able to enhance existing IT capabilities by
selecting and using suppliers that can best provide certain IT functions. To safeguard
against potential risks, these organizations rely on various tactics such as using fixed
pricing to reduce costs, using fixed term contracts to encourage good ITO
performance from suppliers, or using detailed contracts to minimize contractual
hazards. On the other hand, organization in the fourth configuration are industry
leaders that have greater experience with ITO. They outsource a majority of their IT
functions and deal with a wide range of suppliers. These are often large companies
with more than 10 years of ITO experience and annual revenue from $500 million up
to $1 billion dollars. Due to the sheer number of ITO contracts they have, these
organizations rely on fixed term contracts as a way to safeguard against agency risks
and achieve good ITO services from their suppliers.
The last configuration includes organizations that are innovators using ITO services.
These organizations outsource most of their IT functions using a diversified number
of suppliers and utilizing detailed contracts. This strategy allows them to combine the
best attributes from the best-of-breed outsourcing as well as matured outsourcing
clients. As a result, these firms are able to leverage best-practices offered by ITO
services to be innovative and disruptive, introduce new products, services, or enter
new markets. It is not surprising that many of these innovators are companies with the
shortest amount of ITO experience but are the largest in terms of size and revenue
(more than 10,000 employees and $1 billion dollars in annual revenue). We posit that
these companies are using best-practices in ITO services as a way to overcome their
handicap in IT capabilities and break in new markets or areas.

ITO Configurations
1.
“Reducing contractual hazards”: diversified
suppliers and detailed contracts
2.
Matured outsourcing clients: majority
outsourcing model and fixed term contracts
3.
Best-of-breed outsourcing: diversified suppliers
(fixed pricing or fixed term contracts or detailed contracts)
4.
Industry leaders: majority outsourcing model,
flexible-type suppliers, and fixed term contracts
5.
Innovators: majority outsourcing model,
diversified suppliers, and detailed contracts
Table 7.

Organizational
Outcome
Cost Reduction
Cost Reduction
Capability
Enhancement
Capability
Enhancement
Strategic Innovation

ITO Configurations and Organizational Outcomes.

In addition, we performed post hoc analysis to compare firms with different
organizational outcomes in terms of their ITO experience, size, and revenue. We
found that firms with high capability enhancement outcome have a lot more ITO
experience (10 years) while firms with strategic innovation outcome is much larger in
size and revenue (10,000+ employees and $1B+ in revenue). These findings suggest
there are two possible pathways for successful ITO outcome. On one hand, there
might be a maturity cycle in ITO – the longer a firm engages in outsourcing, the more
capability is developed. The four configurations we identified for cost reduction and
capability enhancement are also consistent with our maturity lifecycle interpretation –
firms appear to first adopt ITO to reduce cost. As firms gain experience and become
more mature, they begin to outsource more of their IT services to the point of using
majority outsourcing model. Mature firms then move on to focus on using ITO to
enhance capability. On the other hand, we posit that firms can choose to not follow a
maturity cycle in ITO. Instead, firms with less ITO experience but have plentiful
resources can apply “best practices” of ITO to leapfrog in their IT capabilities and use
them as a strategy to disrupt existing markets or to break into new markets. These
firms attempt to leverage the expertise of their ITO suppliers to allow them catch up
in innovative initiatives and introduce new products, services, or ideas to strategically
insert themselves into new markets.
Our findings have a number of implications for practice. For the clients on ITO, the
multiple configurations we identified suggest different strategic intents for ITO. One
key benefit of using fuzzy-set logics is the ability to identify multiple causal paths to
the same outcome, or the idea of equifinality. Our findings suggest that ITO clients
should configure their outsourcing arrangements to best fit their strategic intents and
level of maturity. Similarly, for ITO suppliers, our findings suggest the need to adjust
to these configurations as they pursue business with different clients.

Our study has a number of limitations. First of all, response rate to our survey is still
relatively low and hence our sample size remains small, which limit the
generalizability of our findings. We plan to continue to collect survey response and
hope to increase our sample size in the future. Moreover, future research should
explore further how firms use outsourcing as means to implement innovative
initiatives. Understanding this emerging ITO objective can shed light on how firms
reconfigure their overall organizations as they pursue strategic innovation.

5.0

Conclusion

In this study, we took the configurational approach to examine ITO-outcomes
relationships. We adopted a set-theoretic empirical method to study conjunctural
causality. Our findings suggest that there are indeed multiple patterns of using ITO to
producing specific organizational outcomes, and managers should approach ITO from
a configurational perspective, as opposed to managing ITO from the perspective of
isolated factors. Our results contribute to a more holistic understanding of ITO, and
take the first step toward greater integration of multiple theories and potential
reconciliation of conflicting empirical findings.
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